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Clinton II Panel 
Seth P. Waxman: Solicitor General, 1997-2001. 
Walter E. Dellinger III: Acting Solicitor General, 1996-1997. 
Barbara D. Underwood: Acting Solicitor General, 2001; Principal 
Deputy Solicitor General, 1998-2001. 
Michael R. Dreeben: Assistant to the Solicitor General, 1988-1994; 
Deputy Solicitor General, 1994-present. 
Seth Waxman: I came up here and promptly put my papers 
down firmly between Michael Dreeben and [the statue of] Rex Lee, 
which is a wonderful place to situate oneself. I came back from the 
break to find my papers placed in the number one seat. That being 
now the case, I will use my prerogative to take the last fifteen 
minutes of this session. It makes sense for Walter to speak first, since 
he was the acting SG during the first seven months of Clinton II. I 
suggest we then hear from Barbara and Michael, and I will bat clean 
up-taking the unenviable position of being the only thing that 
stands--or speaks-between you and lunch. I am quite mindful of 
my own highly underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint when 
speaking without the Supreme Court's red light. So it is partly to 
protect myself that I will go last. 
Walter Dellinger: The last time I was here, I knew I was going 
to be taking over the SG's Office and had a chance to meet with Rex 
Lee privately. After a wonderful lunch that we had-and no one else 
knew-I told him in confidence that I was going to be taking over 
that office. It was a truly wonderful experience. 
I have here a surprising number of former students, for someone 
of my youth. On the faculty of Brigham Young University, Lynn 
Wardle and Jack Welch; and elder of the Church [oEJesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints] Todd Christofferson, are all former students of 
mine, as well as Michael Dreeben and Ken Starr-an unusually large 
number that makes me particularly honored to be here. 
Let me slow down and calm down a bit. 
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Seth Waxman: Don't slow down too much! 
Walter Dellinger: I'll speak more slowly within the allotted time 
of this panel. 
I think there have been eras in which the Solicitor General's 
Office in a sense tried to wall itself off from the administration and 
hoped that other people were not noticing what it was doing. If they 
read about it in the papers, that was fine, but it was too late to do 
anything. As I was beginning to describe [in the previous panel], I 
took almost the exact opposite tack-active confrontation-in order 
to make sure that my superiors, the attorney general and the 
president, understood the professional view of the long-range 
interest of the United States. I think probably I met more frequently 
with the president on legal issues that Ken was describing, and I gave 
this advice to Ted Olson when he and I had meetings before his 
confirmation hearings. 
I thought it useful to go over to the White House before the 
term began to meet with the attorney general and the deputy 
attorney general and then to go meet at the White House with the 
president and the White House Counsel. I reviewed everything that 
was coming up and what position we would plan to take, and which 
ones we thought they might disagree with us on, and if they were 
inclined to disagree with us, why I thought they were wrong. 
I had the advantage of longevity in the administration when I 
came in, which was a very useful fact. I had been head of the OLC 
[Office of Legal Counsel] for nearly four years, and I was 
accustomed to telling the administration "no," which is something 
you do more often in the role of solicitor general. Particularly given 
some of the particularities of this administration, I had to say "no" 
perhaps more often than usual, but I was quite comfortable with that 
role and with fairly regular communications with the White House. 
As I said, I tended to wind up pushing us in a somewhat more 
conservative direction just by the nature of the office. The short 
example is Agostini v. Felton/o4 where I did believe it was fully 
defensible that we could ask the Court to overrule Aguilar v. 
Felton. 2os [We believed] the use of Title I funds to provide remedial 
assistance to low-income, learning-disabled children wherever they 
204. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
205. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
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can be found during the school day, including the public schools, 
was both constitutional and highly defensible, and we were not 
asking the Court to reconsider its 1970s precedent. And though we 
tried to be somewhat cautious, I did have to ignore some constraints 
from those that wanted us not to set a precedent that would lead to 
a bad outcome. It was inevitable that a decision overruling Aguilar 
v. Felton would be a step down that road, but I did meet early and 
often with the Secretary of Education to make sure that he 
understood the position we were going to be taking. 
I think it is very important in certain cases to recognize that the 
president is your superior, and not some deputy White House 
Counsel. I much admired one solicitor general whom I heard say on 
the phone when he was asked, "Do you recognize that the president 
has the authority to overrule you?" He said, "I do recognize that. 
What I do not recognize is that I was speaking with the president of 
the United States." As, of course, he was not. On one occasion when 
Jack Quinn spent some hours trying to persuade me that we wanted 
to be supporting referendum advocates in a case called Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona/o6 [because] the Ninth Circuit had taken 
a case that was jurisdictionally flawed in nine different ways and 
because we sort of believed in referendum people. I finally had to 
say, "If you want to take this to the president, take it to the 
president." A great check is to tell people that you want the 
president personally involved. "If you think it is important enough to 
engage the president, then I am happy to be overruled. I am happy 
to be overruled. But I am not talking to the president." I actually 
learned that from one of my predecessors. That, I think, is a very 
good stance to take, that an SG be overruled on a question like that 
only if the matter is of sufficient importance that it is taken to the 
president, and the president hears you out. And then I think you 
ought to carefully acknowledge who is elected by the electoral 
process of Article II of the Constitution and who is not, who is 
named in the Constitution and who is not, and who is entitled to 
make these decisions for the executive branch and who is not. That is 
the key. 
206. 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
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In Piscataway,207 Sharon Taxman was dismissed [from her job as 
a high school teacher]. She would have been entitled, by virtue of 
winning a coin flip, to seniority to maintain a position when the 
school board reduced the number of positions in the business 
faculty.208 I think there was no defense of diversity there that was at 
all tenable because the school system did not lack diversity-it was 
only a lack of diversity among ten teachers in the business 
curriculum-and there was no showing that any students had their 
curriculum dominated by courses in this one particular part of the 
high school curriculum. The Bush administration had joined Sharon 
Taxman to bring this lawsuit. During Clinton I, we had reversed 
positions and sided with the school board defending their policy. I 
had argued against that from my vantage point at OLC, and when 
the matter got to the Supreme Court, I found myself in the position 
of making the call in the Solicitor General's Office. 
I was told there was no way we could get the administration to 
do a double reverse and a double back flip, but I really thought the 
position we would be arguing was utterly untenable. It was wrong as 
a matter of law and terrible for a civil rights policy. To me it was as 
untenable as the position that Don [Ayer] was faced with in arguing 
that the right answer is zero-to argue why, in light of Wyganf09 
and other cases, the right answer is that you do not need any 
justification, or you do not need to demonstrate a lack of diversity or 
not in this case. I thought the predicted reaction of the Court was to 
say that "if this is what they think they mean by affirmative action, 
we are going to have to say the only answer is zero." And I do not 
happen to believe that the right answer is zero. I believe it is 
somewhere along the axis of where Justice Powell and Justice 
O'Connor would be. 
But in that instance, knowing how difficult it would be to get 
the administration to suffer a reversal on the part of the civil rights 
207. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), eert.granted, 
521 u.s. 1117 (1997), ecrt. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). 
208. When layoffs were necessary, state law required the school board to retain the 
teachers with the most seniority. In cases where teachers of equal seniority both had a claim to 
the last available position, the school board's policy was to determine by a coin flip which 
teacher would be retained. Taxman (who is white) and a black teacher had equal seniority, but 
only one of them could be retained. Instead of following the coin-flip policy, the school board 
decided to lay off Taxman in the interest of creating a diverse faculty. See Taxmall, 91 F.3d at 
1550-52. 
209. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
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community, I scheduled meetings with the leadership of the civil 
rights community and explained what our position was going to be. 
I can say that I knew that they would disagree, but thoroughly 
ventilating it with them [was important] before I then asked for a 
meeting with the president, where I was accompanied by my deputy, 
Seth Waxman. I think that was one of the best meetings I had in the 
government, where we set out why we thought we needed to take 
the position that we thought that the school board was wrong and 
that Sharon Taxman should prevail, even though we thought the 
Third Circuit had gone too far in a scorched-earth, zero-is-the-
answer opinion. The president agreed to let us do that, and I 
thought early engagement was the way to take that position. 
Finally, let me just mention one other example. Not only is it 
proper for the solicitor general to enter into cases where he believes 
that the Court may have gone wrong, but he can also be useful even 
where the administration does not have a programmatic interest. 
Being an amicus is a real joy because you can sort of pick your 
position. You do not have a real client. That was true of the 
physician-assisted suicide cases, where I thought our office played its 
most useful role of any in my time. 
The physician-assisted suicide debate came down, in that term, 
to a debate between what I thought were somewhat untenably 
extreme positions. One was the right-to-die position, argued by the 
advocates who had prevailed in the Ninth Circuit and in the Second 
Circuit, that there was a constitutional right to die. The argument by 
the states of New York and Washington was that there was no 
cognizable liberty interest involved here at all. Now, I was persuaded 
by talking to a number of people-by some very thoughtful 
reflections by career people at the SG's Office-that there really was 
a deeply cognizable liberty interest in ameliorating pain and 
suffering. But that ended there. You could not simply say there is no 
liberty interest here; Cruzan's21O supposition that one has a right to 
resist unwanted medical treatment should really be the law-there 
should be a liberty interest in declining unwanted medical treatment, 
and that should be extended to those who wish to avoid the 
infliction of pain. But for the present, the states did have a quite 
legitimate and, indeed, compelling interest in preventing lethal 
medication, and there were not sufficient safeguards in place. The 
210. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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line they used at oral argument was to say that the problem that the 
states are concerned with is a legitimate one: in a managed care, 
cost-conscious system, lethal medication is the least expensive 
treatment for any illness. So the states have, at this time, a very 
serious reason for not unleashing cheap, inexpensive lethal 
medication in the cost-conscious medical care system, but you 
should not say that there is no liberty interest here of any 
substantiality at all. 
So we were able to take the position that made the states 
somewhat unhappy, though our bottom line was that their statutes 
were constitutional, and that made the right-to-life philosophical 
commitment group unhappy. And I thought it made Justice 
O'Connor unhappy because she started questioning me about it 
before I could say, "May it please the court." But it is the position 
she came to. She already had come to it and was testing it out. That 
allowed Justice O'Connor to capture the Court, essentially adopting 
the position of the middle that we put forth. I think the two sides of 
the client interests did not have the flexibility to argue a more 
intermediate position, which really did appeal to the Court. I think 
that it is a very useful function to have a body who can sometimes 
take a position in between what the parties do. It does not have to 
be the solicitor general, but [the SG's Office has] the only people 
who have access to the Court, to come in in certain cases without a 
strong client agenda and to try and help the Court figure out what is 
the right resolution. 
The single best decision I made as solicitor general was to select 
Seth Waxman as my deputy. And to save time for Seth, I will move 
this on to Barbara. 
Seth Waxman: Thank you, Walter. When I said, "Don't go too 
slow," I hope you understood that-
Walter Dellinger: I did. You have said it to me many times! 
[Waxman and Dellinger laugh.] 
Seth Waxman: Barbara was my "political" deputy-I guess that 
is what we are calling it for purposes of this conference. When I 
became SG I understood that I could pick pretty much anyone I 
wanted as a political deputy. I do not think I have ever had a 
"political" conversation with Barbara, and I do not consider myself 
133 
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to be much of a political partisan. In fact, I am quite confident that 
this was the only time that the political deputy position has been 
filled by a career prosecutor. My prior professional involvement with 
Barbara was in the role of her student: Barbara taught me Criminal 
Law I and Criminal Law II at the Yale Law School. When I joined 
the administration of Janet Reno, I was amazed to discover that 
Barbara was the First Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District 
of New York. And when I became SG and thought hard about what 
I most wanted in terms of a deputy, it was the person who had made 
such an impression upon me as a young law student. And so my 
"political deputy" was in fact detailed from the Executive Office of 
United States Attorneys. So, for the views of my "political" deputy, 
here is Barbara. 
Barbara Underwood: In that vein, I think I probably had the 
distinction of being the only political deputy to be retained as the 
acting solicitor general by a new administration of a different 
political party. I took it as a tribute to the nonpolitical character of 
my work as the so-called political deputy. I suggest that "political" is 
not quite the right word. The person in that position is also, and 
more appropriately, known as the principal deputy. It's a position 
that allows the head of the agency to appoint one new deputy to 
work with the career deputies who remain from one administration 
to the next. It makes a lot of sense, and not just "political" sense, 
that when somebody becomes the head of an office that person 
should be able to bring in one new principal assistant. Maybe I am 
particularly sympathetic to that view since I have gone from one 
government office to another in just that role-as first assistant, or 
right-hand person, to a series of state and federal agency heads. 
Most of what I did in the Solicitor General's Office was 
completely without political content, but it is true that the principal 
deputy can play a role in dealing with the White House, or with 
political people in other agencies, in a way that might be more 
difficult for career members of the solicitor general's staff. 
One case that required me to discuss sensitive political questions 
with people in the White House Counsel's office was Stenberg v. 
Carhart/II the so-called "partial birth abortion" case, which 
involved a state statute that was, as the Supreme Court eventually 
211. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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held, both hopelessly vague and an undue burden on women's 
health and abortion rights, but at the same time was aimed at a 
problem in which the states had a legitimate interest. Prior 
administrations had been criticized for filing amicus curiae briefs in 
abortion cases, on the ground that the federal government had no 
programmatic interest in the issue. But it seemed clear to, among 
others, the Department of Health and Human Services that we did 
have a strong programmatic interest, because the federal government 
provides or pays for health services, including abortions, to people 
who depend for health care on the Indian Health Service, the federal 
Bureau of Prisons, or Medicare or Medicaid, and thus the statute 
could affect the ability of the federal government to provide or pay 
for medically appropriate abortion services to those people. The 
Department of Health and Human Services was a very strong 
proponent of filing a brief amicus curiae in support of the doctor's 
challenge to the statute. 
In addition, the president had taken a strong public stand on 
the issue. Congress had passed somewhat similar bills, and the 
president had vetoed them stating that these particular bills were 
vague and were an undue burden on the right to abortion, but that 
he would sign a suitably precise and tailored bill that allowed 
abortions of this type when necessary for a woman's health. 
The question was whether we could and should file a brief 
that would (1) protect and advance the interest of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, (2) be consistent with what the 
president had said, and (3) be useful to the Court, or whether we 
should just stay out of the case. Some thought that it would be 
appropriate for the solicitor general to file such a brief, but that such 
a brief could not be written. That, of course, was a lawyer's 
challenge. We set out to meet the challenge by drafting a brief that 
met all three objectives, we persuaded the skeptics that we had done 
so and filed the brief, and the Supreme Court essentially adopted our 
Views. 
In the course of working out the government's position in that 
case, we served a function that is quite characteristic of the solicitor 
general's role as amicus curiae. It's a role that Walter was just 
describing in the right-to-die cases. We took a more moderate 
position than that favored by either of the parties in the case. The 
lawyers for the doctor wanted to argue that any attempt to regulate 
the method by which abortions are performed is unlawful, while the 
135 
HeinOnline -- 2003 BYU L. Rev. 136 2003
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
state took the position that almost any regulation short of 
prohibition is lawful. We were saying something in between-that 
while there is room for lawful regulation of abortion, this statute had 
two fatal defects: first, it was so vague that doctors could not know 
whether they were complying with it or not, and second, it was too 
broad, in that it prohibited abortions that were necessary for the 
health and safety of some women. 
That whole process of deciding whether to file and what to say in 
such a politically sensitive matter would have been very difficult for 
someone who did not have the political confidence of the White 
House Counsel's office as well as the professional respect of the 
lawyers in the Solicitor General's Office. Convincing the president's 
staff that the brief satisfied all the necessary interests required 
political-or perhaps diplomatic-skills. But writing the brief 
required only the traditional advocacy skills familiar to every member 
of the solicitor general's staff. 
The work of the Solicitor General's Office calls on advocacy skills 
of a very special sort. I'd like to talk about one role of the solicitor 
general that is not often available to other litigants: the role of 
helping the Court to decide which of the many possible cases should 
be selected as the vehicle to bring an issue before the Court. The 
laws and legal theories that the solicitor general defends can arise in a 
wide variety of factual contexts, and the SG has a greater opportunity 
than most litigants to try to put the government's position before 
the Court in a case with favorable facts. 
We tried very hard to do that in a series of cases that arose during 
my tenure involving the Disabilities Act.212 One issue was whether 
the Disabilities Act protects people who have correctable disabilities. 
The [Justice Department's] Civil Rights Division and the EEOC 
[Equal Employment Opportunities Commission], who enforce the 
Disabilities Act, argued strongly that it does. We hoped to present 
that issue to the Court in a case involving diabetes or epilepsy-
serious conditions that can be controlled with medication, but 
nevertheless often result in discrimination. Unfortunately, the case in 
which the Court decided the issue involved not people with epilepsy 
or diabetes, but people who were near-sighted and wore glasses. 213 
212. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12150 
(1990). 
213. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
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The Court had asked for the views of the solicitor general as to 
whether certiorari should be granted in the glasses case, and we 
urged the Court not to take the case. Unfortunately, they ignored 
our advice. Not surprisingly, on facts like that, the Court found that 
the Disabilities Act does not cover correctable disabilities. 
In another case we had more success in getting a legal question 
before the Court on sympathetic facts. Many states were challenging 
the applicability of the Disabilities Act to state governments, as 
employers and as providers of public facilities. In defending against 
that challenge, we wanted to go to the Court in a case involving 
especially egregious discrimination. My personal favorite was one 
involving a state courthouse that was accessible only through large 
flights of steps. A person in a wheelchair was suing to compel the 
state to provide him with access to the courthouse by some means 
other than crawling up the steps. That case remained pending in the 
court of appeals, and was not ripe for review by the Supreme Court. 
But we found another case that also presented very sympathetic facts: 
a recovered breast cancer patient who had been removed from her 
job as a nursing supervisor in a state hospital.2\4 Despite the favorable 
facts, and despite a really splendid legislative record of state 
discrimination on the basis of disability, the Court nevertheless 
rejected our position and found the states immune to suit. I suppose 
that shows that facts are not everything; sometimes there is simply a 
pure disagreement about the law. 
In another case, though, the process of trying to engineer the 
facts may have made a difference. There was a split in the circuits 
about whether a law enforcement officer could invoke qualified 
immunity to a suit for the unconstitutional use of excessive force. 
Some courts had held that there could be no immunity in such cases, 
because immunity is only for reasonable mistakes, and excessive force 
is by definition unreasonable. Other courts had adopted our view, 
that because the law of excessive force evolves, an officer can make a 
reasonable mistake about actions a court later finds unreasonable. 
The issue was before the Court in a state tort case in which a 
New Orleans police officer had shot a fleeing felon in the back, 
paralyzing him; the paralyzed man had sued the officer. While the 
officer claimed he saw a gun, there was no evidence to support that 
claim, or so the briefs said. The Fifth Circuit had ruled that although 
214. Bd. of Trustees ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
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the officer used excessive force, he was entitled to immunity from 
suit because his mistake was reasonable,215 and the case was now 
before the Court on the victim's petition to the Supreme Court. We 
were quite concerned that this case was going to make bad law for 
the government, that the Court would conclude that there can be no 
immunity for use of excessive force, because an officer can never be 
reasonable in doing an unreasonable thing like shooting somebody 
in the back. 
I asked the attorney who was working with me on the case to dig 
into the record to see what we could find. There had to be more to 
this story. We found two gems in the record. First, we found that 
these people were running through a swamp in waist-deep mud, so 
their failure to find the fleeing felon's gun did not show he didn't 
have one-if he had dropped it in the mud they would have been 
unable to find it. 
Seth Waxman: That also gives new meamng to the word 
"fleeing. " 
Barbara Underwood: Yes. 
Seth Waxman: If they are waist-deep in the mud. 
Barbara Underwood: And second, the trial court had given an 
instruction that was not right on anybody's theory of the law but 
favored the defendant, and he lost anyway. So it muddied the legal 
question. We filed an amicus brief urging the Court to dismiss the 
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted because the case did not 
really present the very important legal question that the Court had 
intended to decide. And that is just what the Court did. The result 
was good for the city and the officer, since they had won below. And 
it was good for us because we got to litigate the issue a year or so 
later, on much better facts. 
The case that eventually led to a decision on the issue involved 
somebody who had been violating restrictions on demonstrations at 
a San Francisco military base and had caused some concern about the 
215. Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.granted, 525 U.S. 1098 
(1999), cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1083 (1999). 
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welfare of the vice president, who was only a few feet away.216 He 
claimed that when federal law enforcement officers arrested him, 
they shoved him too hard. In that case we successfully argued that 
the officers were immune, and that an officer can reasonably believe 
he is using appropriate force even if a court later finds the force was 
excessive. I think if the issue had gone up on the New Orleans 
shooting, instead of the California shove, we could well have had a 
different result. 
Seth Waxman: Just to punctuate the presentations of my non-
career and career deputies, I want to react to some of the things that 
have been said suggesting that one of the functions of the non -career 
appointees is to insulate and protect the career attorneys from the 
administration in power. I have a different view. I think one of the 
great strengths under our system of government is the wonderful 
dialectic and transparency between career people and non -career 
people: each has to accommodate the other, and the country is 
stronger for that. I strove to conduct the operations of my office, 
and its relations with the president and the attorney general and 
other non-career appointees, so as to make little or no distinction 
between my non-career deputy and my career deputies. Maybe I 
created facts on the ground by appointing a career political deputy. 
To some extent I was able to do this because of the perspective of 
the president and the attorney general I served. Janet Reno was 
insistent about learning first-hand the views of the career prosecutors 
and law enforcement officials; she did not want those views filtered 
through political appointees. The least important people in Janet 
Reno's legendary meetings about issues were the non-career people. 
And as a result, I did not distinguish in case assignments, or in the 
way people talked within the office, between Barbara and the other 
deputies. But Michael will speak for himself-and I'm confident will 
do so characteristically well. 
Michael Dreeben: I want to pick up exactly where Seth left off 
because in late Clinton I and Clinton II, there were two cases that 
crossed the criminal docket that really put the Solicitor General's 
Office in the eye of a huge political storm. I want to describe how 
the office reacted to those cases in determining what position the 
216. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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solicitor general would ultimately take. Of course, the solicitor 
general determined that himself, but he had help from the staff. I 
will use these stories to try to illustrate how the established 
traditional processes of the department helped to diffuse and prevent 
political pressures from obscuring the solicitor general's ability to 
choose what the legal rule is that he should support. 
The first case is an indirect decedent of the Morrison v. Olson217 
case th~t was described earlier. As a result of the Supreme Court's 
having upheld the independent counsel statute, a former solicitor 
general, Ken Starr, was able to take on a second career as an 
independent counsel and that, of course, involved the Whitewater 
investigation. Now, our office really would have loved to stay as far 
away from anything to do with that investigation as absolutely 
possible. But as fate would have it, we found ourselves caught in the 
middle of a dispute that landed on the Supreme Court's docket with 
the following caption: Office of the President) petitioner v. Office of the 
Independent Counsel.218 Now, these are two branches of the United 
States and normally one would think that they should not be on 
opposite sides. But as it developed, this case grew out of a subpoena 
that the independent counsel issued for notes that were taken of 
conversations between Hillary Rodham Clinton and White House 
attorneys in preparation for grand jury appearances and congressional 
appearances. The Office of the President asserted an attorney-client 
privilege. The District Court accepted [the assertion of privilege] in a 
kind of odd way, saying that Mrs. Clinton thought there was one at 
the time, and therefore she is entitled to rely on it.219 The Eighth 
Circuit reversed220 and said there is no attorney-client privilege for 
the First Lady or any other government official who consults with 
government counsel as opposed to private counsel. 
At that point, the case resulted in a certiorari petition, and it 
came to the attention of Walter Dellinger and Seth Waxman that this 
may be an issue on which we have some interest in trying to decide 
whether the United States, through the Justice Department, has 
something to say. And it would not be enough to have just two gray 
217. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
218. Office of President v. Office ofIndep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). 
219. 111 re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(citing unpublished order of the District Court). 
220. Id. 
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briefs in the case. We needed a third gray brief in the case that 
represented the institutional interests of government.22l 
We went about deciding what to do not as one might think 
would be conceivable, by calling up the White House and saying, 
"What do you want us to do? I mean, after all we work for you." 
Instead, we processed this in the same way that we would handle any 
case that was high-profile enough and had an energetic counsel team 
involved. We had meetings first with-I think it was first, I am not 
sure of the order-first with Andy Frey, who was retained to 
represent the Office of the President in seeking certiorari to reverse 
the Eighth Circuit's judgment and who wanted to either persuade us 
to stay out of the case or, better still, come in and support the Office 
of the President fully. We also had a meeting with the independent 
counsel, who wanted to persuade us that the Eighth Circuit was 
correct, that people who work for the government cannot consult 
government lawyers and then keep information from a federal grand 
jury. Those presentations to Acting Solicitor General Dellinger 
presented a very, very difficult case. And I would not suggest for a 
moment that Walter was either at a loss for words or at a loss for 
what to do in the case, but he promptly disqualified himself, and it 
fell to Seth as acting solicitor general to then determine the position 
of the United States. 
What we typically do in a case like this is exactly what happened 
in this case. We received memos from all of the components of 
government. We had had excellent presentations from the parties, 
who were also components of government. And we were presented 
with two completely different views, which were in their own way 
rather absolute. Andy Frey argued that the attorney-client privilege is 
and always must be an absolute privilege, and, since it attaches to 
government officials who consult with attorneys, it must be retained 
inviolate. The independent counsel maintained, on the other hand, 
that you cannot have a privilege when everybody is part of the same 
client; he added many more sophisticated ideas, but the essential 
point was zero privilege. 
What is interesting is that we ultimately did file a brief in support 
of the petition for a writ of certiorari, but we took a position, as 
221. The Supreme Court rules provide that "[aJ document filed by the United States, or 
by any other federal party represented by the Solicitor General, shall have a gray cover." S. CT. 
R. 33.1(e). 
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others have explained, that departed from either of the black-and-
white positions that had been presented so far, and did so in a way 
that I think is quintessentially characteristic of the Solicitor General's 
Office. First of all, we spent a lot of time figuring out what the 
caption should be; on whose behalf are we filing this brief? You 
know, the president and the independent counsel were already out 
there, so we really could not say we were filing on behalf of the 
United States because both of these parties believed that they were 
the United States. The president had a pretty good claim. So did the 
independent counsel, since the statute appointed him to represent 
the United States. So we filed a brief, amicus curiae for the United 
States, acting through the attorney general, supporting certiorari. I 
am sure that is a first time for that caption. I hope it is the last. 
But what is most interesting about what we did in this brief is 
that we laid out the positions that had been taken by the parties and 
then began our discussion section with a paragraph that started, "We 
see the matter from a different perspective." We are now talking 
about "we," the institutional government, the attorney general. And 
our perspective was this: Absent an independent counsel statute, any 
dispute like this-between a head of a government agency and a 
prosecutor seeking evidence-would not be resolved in court. It 
would be resolved within the executive branch, potentially with an 
appeal all the way up to the president, in which the competing 
parties could contend. The prosecutor could say, "I need the 
evidence for this prosecution." The agency head could say, "He does 
not need it enough to justify chilling my ability to consult with 
counsel in the performing of my governmental duties." We 
determined that this model of how the Justice Department would do 
things internally, in a nuanced, balanced way, should become the law 
of the land and that courts should attempt to replicate what we 
would do internally. We could not follow the process internally 
because the independent counsel represented prosecutorial interests 
but did not have access to institutional client interests, and the 
president, of course, had interests with respect to the investigation 
that would impede his ability to assess in an objective manner 
whether the grand jury really needed this information. 
We crafted this intermediate position, which suggested that 
certiorari be granted and that the Court address it. Ultimately this 
was a completely unsuccessful proposal. The Court denied certiorari. 
The law has since moved very heavily in favor of the independent 
142 
HeinOnline -- 2003 BYU L. Rev. 143 2003
1] Solicitor General Conference 
counsel's position. I have not gone back and reassessed whether my 
own view of the law is still what we put between gray covers [when 
we wrote the brief]. On behalf of the attorney general, it is notable 
that we filed a brief that had input from Seth Waxman, acting 
solicitor general, the assistant attorney generals in both the Criminal 
and the Civil Divisions, and the deputies of civil and criminal 
matters, myself and Ed Kneedler, and a career assistant, Jim 
Feldman, and this brief was a product of SG policy formulation in a 
pristine fashion. At no point, at least that I am aware of, were we 
ever discussing this case in the kind of partisan political·manner that 
the facts of the case and the circumstances of it could have led 
outsiders to think was going on. 
The second case, and I will talk only briefly about this one-I'll 
let Seth finish the story if he chooses to, and it also involved 
Walter-was Dickerson v. United States. 222 This case presented the 
question about whether Miranda v. Arizona223 should be overruled 
by the Supreme Court---or if you approached from a perspective of 
amicus curiae Paul Cassell, whether § 3501 of the United States 
Code224 should be held to have superseded the non-constitutional 
rule of Miranda. 
A little background, and then I will go to what is really 
interesting about this case from the point of view of our Office. 
Miranda v. Arizona says that unwarned statements-statements in 
which the defendant is not advised of his right to counsel and right 
to remain silent, and has not waived those rights-may not be 
admitted into evidence in the government's case in chief. Two years 
after Miranda, in 1968, Congress passed a statute that can only be 
described as a direct legislative effort to overrule the Court's holding 
in Miranda. There was no mistaking that. The statute, § 3501, said 
that statements are admissible in a federal prosecution if the 
statements are voluntary under a multi-factor test. One of the factors 
was whether the defendant had been warned, but it was simply one 
factor, not the per se rule that the court crafted in Miranda. 
Generations of prosecutors ignored § 3501 because of its direct 
conflict with Miranda and because of the apparent inability of 
Congress to supersede a constitutional decision of the Supreme 
222. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
223. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000). 
143 
HeinOnline -- 2003 BYU L. Rev. 144 2003
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
Court. But there was always a faction who believed that Miranda 
was an illegitimate decision and should be attacked at the earliest 
possible moment. The Supreme Court gave some fuel to that by 
deciding a series of cases in which it distinguished between a true 
violation of the Fifth Amendment and a violation of the prophylactic 
rules surrounding the Fifth Amendment. 
This came to a head for the first time in twenty years when acting 
Solicitor General Dellinger was in our office. We did not rely on 
3501 as a matter o(policy, but a prosecutor in the Eastern District of 
Virginia decided that he was going to rely on 3501 as a way to admit 
a statement that arguably was taken in violation of Miranda. 
Actually, as it turns out, we had some pretty good evidence that the 
Miranda warnings were given, but that evidence was not presented 
at the suppression hearing. As a result, you had this crazy case come 
up where we said Miranda warnings had been given, the judge 
found that they had not been given, the prosecutor said that it did 
not matter that they had not been given because of § 3501, and the 
department was in something of a mess. 
When we found out about this, we recognized that this was a 
ticking time bomb, and Walter had the U.S. Attorney's Office 
withdraw the brief. The United States should not be filing briefs in 
district courts that are contrary to binding Supreme Court 
precedent, at least unless you are prepared to go all the way to the 
Supreme Court and encourage the overruling of Miranda. And that 
had not been, to say the leas~, vetted and cleared. 
But our effort to keep this issue out of the courts was 
unsuccessful because the Fourth Circuit, on its own, decided that 
§ 3501 did supersede Miranda, that Miranda was a 
non-constitutional rule, and that it, as a court of law rather than a 
court of politics, was obligated to apply § 3501 even though the 
Justice Department, which seemed [to the Fourth Circuit] to be a 
department of politics rather than law, is not relying on it.225 Our 
position in the Fourth Circuit, articulated and defined by Walter, was 
very clear: As a lower federal court, you cannot say that Miranda is 
not a constitutional decision, and you cannot enforce a statute that 
does away with a constitutional decision of the Supreme Court. That 
position did not impress the Fourth Circuit, which considered en 
banc but rejected it. 
225. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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It left us with a very strange situation that obviously pits a lot of 
different competing interests in the government. Number one, this 
was our prosecution. We wanted to put Dickerson in jail. He was a 
bank robber. He robbed banks not too far from where I lived. We 
wanted to see this guy off the streets. It would help to have his sort 
of non-confession.Oh, the other thing I forgot to say is he did not 
really confess. What he did was tell a false exculpatory story that he 
was out getting bagels while his partner was in robbing the bank. We 
could not use this evidence. It would have been nice to use this 
evidence. As prosecutors, the government's interest is to get this 
stuff into evidence. 
In the Solicitor General's Office, when somebody files a cert 
petition against us, as Dickerson did, our first instinct is to file a brief 
in opposition to keep the case out of the Court. But this one was 
obviously unique. The Fourth Circuit had invalidated a binding 
decision of the Supreme Court, and we saw no choice but to tell the 
Supreme Court that the case had to be heard. The question is: What 
should the Court do on the merits? And I am only going to touch 
on this and then turn it over to Seth to finish. Basically, we were 
dealing in an environment where there were not, at least as I am 
aware, precedents in the SG's Office that would guide us on how to 
handle it. It is standard SG lore-department lore that was 
articulated by Rex Lee, William French Smith, Theodore Olson, and 
many other people, that the solicitor general will defend the 
constitutionality of a statute unless it is plainly unconstitutional 
(which generally means no reasonable argument, no professionally 
respectable argument, is available for it-in other words, it flunks the 
"risibility standard" that was articulated earlier), or it impermissibly 
encroaches on executive branch functions. 
Now, what was paradoxical here is this law is plainly 
unconstitutional under Miranda, but there were reasonable 
arguments that Miranda should be overruled. And the question is: 
What do you do then? Is the executive branch then obligated to go 
to the Supreme Court and urge the overruling of a constitutional 
precedent simply because there are reasonable arguments available 
for that purpose? If you succeed in that effort, you validate a federal 
law. Or do the executive branch and the solicitor general have some 
independent judgment in determining which should stand: a 
constitutional precedent or a statute that was passed in the teeth of 
that [precedent]? That dilemma implicated interests that go to all 
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aspects of the Solicitor General's Office: political, institutional, our 
criminal law enforcement interests, our role as the "tenth Justice" 
(using that [phrase] as just a symbol for our duty to the Court and 
to respect its precedents). 
To determine what we should do, we instituted the most 
wide-ranging outreach that I have ever seen in the department to 
components of the government to see what their views were. All of 
the U.S. Attorneys were asked to express their views. Many of the 
divisions expressed their views. It culminated in a meeting in South 
Carolina in which there was oral debate on the issue and finally a 
meeting with the attorney general in which representatives, U.S. 
Attorneys, took different positions, presented their views. Mter all 
was heard and said and done, the solicitor general made a 
determination that the interests of stare decisis in this case were 
compelling and that the United States did not have a legal argument 
based on the needs of law enforcement that could justify overturning 
Miranda v. Arizona. Thus, we filed a brief that said, "Don't 
overturn Miranda v. Arizona." There was a firestorm of political 
criticism that ensued. We held fast, and ultimately, the Court, in a 
seven-to-two decision, agreed that Miranda should not be 
overruled. 
Before turning it over to Seth, the only epilogue I want to give 
to this story is that after all of this happened, Dickerson was still a 
defendant. He went back down. The United States tried him 
without the ability to use his so-called "confession" in the case in 
chief. He decided to take the stand and testify. And as a result of 
that, he was impeached with his statements-[ a use of the 
statements] which the court held was permissible and compatible 
with Miranda. So we got the statements in, he was convicted, and 
he is currently serving a fourteen-year sentence. 
Seth Waxman: I will say a few words about Dickerson, both 
because Michael has made it impossible not to and also because in 
some ways it represents the very best about how all of the wonderful, 
tried-and-true processes of the SG's Office ought to work. Dickerson 
was very much like the other case that Michael talked about (which 
is one of, I think, two significant privilege controversies which the 
Independent Counsel laid on our doorstep). These cases may have 
appeared to the outside world as paradigmatically cases in which we 
would be hearing from the White House, or talking to the White 
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House, or thinking about things other than the long-term 
institutional interests of the United States. But absolutely nothing of 
the sort ever happened, nor was any effort made by any political 
person to intrude in our decision-making policy. 
Michael served up very well the issue of the thumb that often 
appears on the scale of defending the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress. In the § 3501 context, as we saw it, the solicitor general 
could not credibly argue that Miranda had not been treated by the 
Supreme Court as constitutionally based: the Court, in almost three 
dozen cases since Miranda itself was decided (and indeed in 
Miranda itself) had required the states to comply with the so-called 
Miranda rules, yet the Court has no authority to dictate criminal 
rules and procedure to the states unless the Constitution so requires. 
On the other hand, I did view it as fully available to us to ask the 
Supreme Court to overrule Miranda. In his book, Order and Law/26 
Charles Fried recounts a similar decision he had to make together 
with the attorney general he served. Like Charles, I determined that 
I could not credibly make that argument. In my mind, any such 
request-after all the time that had passed and all the reliance that 
had been placed on Miranda4ad to be built on an empirical 
showing that the Miranda regime was demonstrably detrimental to 
the long-term interests of the United States. We would have to tell 
the Supreme Court, "Look, it just does not work and in fact it has 
had a significant, documentable, adverse effect on law enforcement, 
public safety, and therefore, on individual liberties. " And not just tell 
the Justices, but show them. 
So, as Michael says, we went out and systematically solicited the 
views of all ninety-four U.S. Attorneys, and of every federal police 
agency-the FBI, the Secret Service, Marshals Service, all of the 
Treasury and Justice Department agencies. We asked for data, 
anecdotal evidence, anything that they had to offer us as prosecutors 
or as police officers, about the efficacy or inefficacy of Miranda. 
There was much less than one would have imagined. We also invited 
all of those offices and agencies to express their views about whether 
Miranda should or should not be overruled. The "process" we 
provided was exhaustive and exhausting. And at the end, the 
question of what position to take was not really close at all. The 
226. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (Simon & Schuster 1991). 
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the Deputy Attorney General agreed with my conclusion. Because of 
the significance of the issue, though, I asked to speak directly with 
the President to make sure he agreed with the decision. Assisting law 
enforcement was a priority of Bill Clinton's presidency. The Attorney 
General, Deputy Attorney General, and I met with the President in 
the Cabinet Room. I laid out the issues and explained how I planned 
to approach the case. I set forth the case for and against asking the 
Court qj) overrule Miranda in order to save the statute. I told the 
President that I was firmly of the view that principles of stare decisis 
and the long-term interests of the United States counsel against 
asking the Court to overrule Miranda-but that, of course, he could 
direct the contrary position. He looked straight across the table and 
said, "How can I help you?" 
Dickerson was a highly unusual exception to the rule that in 
almost all cases the solicitor general will defend the constitutionality 
of an Act of Congress. One of the signal features of my tenure as SG 
was the requirement for a full-throated application of this duty to 
defend Acts of Congress, because my tenure coincided with an 
extravagant rise in the incidents of declarations by the Supreme 
Court that Acts of Congress were unconstitutional. I delivered a 
lecture about this phenomenon just down the street from Walter 
Dellinger's house at the University of North Carolina. And I 
published an article called "Defending Congress,,,227 which grew out 
of an invitation that Judge Easterbrook gave me to speak about this 
before the Seventh Circuit. 
In the first two hundred years of our republic, and this includes 
the New Deal, the Court declared acts or portions of acts of 
Congress unconstitutional 127 times. If you want the citation, you 
can find it, I think, in footnote seven of my article. A great number 
of those, of course, were early New Deal enactments that fell prey to 
the skeptical scrutiny of the Charles Evans Hughes Court. But in the 
years between 1995 and 2000, the Supreme Court struck down 
twenty-six acts of Congress. That represents an annualized rate that 
is in fact in excess of any block of years, including the early New 
Deal, of the republic. 
One thinks about how detached and dispassionate the arguments 
that a solicitor general before the Supreme Court should make in 
terms of preserving the reputation and integrity of the Court. An 
227. Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1073 (2001). 
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advocate for the United States should never have in mind win-loss 
records. That is particularly the case when the Court is considering 
either the constitutionality of an act of Congress or the federal-state 
balance. In those instances, the calculus is entirely different. And the 
process of trying to answer for myself, on behalf of the United 
States, which acts of Congress we would and would not defend, was 
really the defining characteristic of my tenure. 
One of the very first cases that I argued in the ,Supreme Court 
was Reno v. ACLU,228 the now (in)famous case involving the 
Communications Decency Act,229 which, by the time it reached the 
Supreme Court, had been found unconstitutional in every particular 
by all six federal judges who had considered it. The Act had obvious 
constitutional vulnerabilities, but we thought a reasonable argument 
existed-aggressive to be sure, innovative to a fault-that the Act 
was constitutional. We wrote a brief I am very proud of. I remember 
getting up to argue the case and leaning over to my opponent, the 
late Bruce Ennis just before I started, to say, "Bruce, every 
organization I have ever even heard of is on your side in this case." 
Even the Chicago Symphony had filed an amicus brief opposing the 
statute. As a result, when I stood up to argue, so few thought I had 
even the most remote chance to win the case that I felt almost 
weightless-evoking Cassius Clay's description of what it felt like in 
the ring to "float like a butterfly, sting like a bee." And yet, I fully 
believed in what I was doing. I was not up there telling the Justices 
that if I were in their shoes I would find the law constitutional in 
every respect; that's not my function. The arguments we made were 
credible. They were serious. They deserved to be considered by the 
Court. We made them. And I received two votes for two of the three 
provisions of the statute. Litigators need to define "victory" flexibly. 
The second phenomenon I want to discuss is the challenge of 
defending acts of Congress in an environment in which the Court is 
broadly reconsidering the federal-state, balance. It is judging against 
new constitutional standards laws that were enacted by Congress at a 
time when it had no reason to believe, for example, that legislation 
that was clearly justified under the Commerce Clause also had to be 
the subject of special fact-finding under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
228. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
229. Communications Decency Act ofl996, 47 U.S.c. §§ 230, 560, 561 (1997). 
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It really was Ken Starr who got us started off on this, with the 
government's loss in New York v. United States.230 Drew Days, not 
to be outdone, promptly doubled that by losing both Seminole 
Tribc 3 ! and Lopez.232 Although Walter Dellinger was only there for a 
year, he managed to tie Drew with Printz233 and City of Boerne. 234 
But-not to be immodest-I certainly hold the record for having 
given up the most federal power-all, to be sure, in five-to-four 
decisions. Ted Olsen is free to swing for the fences, but Florida 
Prepaid 235 Alden v Maine 236 Kimel 237 Morrison 238 Garretf39 have , ., , , 
set a record that will be hard to exceed. 
To be sure, I am perhaps the only SG over the past decade 
actually to win a federalism case-indeed, two: Reno v. Condon240 
and Crosby.241 But on balance, the greatest challenge of my tenure 
was adjusting the SG's institutional tradition to defend the 
constitutional judgments of the political branches to a Supreme 
Court environment characterized by a very different vision of the 
federal-state balance. 
The federalism docket does impact on just about all the themes 
that my predecessors and colleagues have talked about during this 
conference. We know, for example, that to some degree, the 
institutional traditions of the office lead most SGs to consider 
themselves a bit more detached and "objective" than the full-
throated partisans representing other litigants. But in the federalism 
debate, the solicitor general has got to be a partisan. He represents 
fully one-half of the entire debate about federal power and the 
prerogative of the national government under our federalist balance. 
The progression of the Supreme Court's recent federalism 
jurisprudence has also significantly reduced the solicitor general's 
230. 505 U.s. 144 (1992). 
231. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
232. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
233. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
234. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
235. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
236. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
237. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
238. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
239. Bd. ofTmstees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
240. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
241. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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ability (real or imagined) to influence the order or factual context in 
which the Court considers important issues. That is because, among 
other things, we live in an era in which private rights of action are 
now the norm, whereas for much of our history they were the 
exception. Nowadays, it is not only, or even primarily, the SG who 
has the ability to invoke federal law and federal civil rights law. 
Somebody who is near-sighted can invoke the Americans with 
Disabilities Act242 without regard to the coherent development of the 
law: he only wants his own benefits. 
Second, the New Deal model of the SG picking cases so that the 
law could be moved incrementally in the direction in which the 
United States wants it to move-looking at cases from Virginian 
Railway43 on, or the way that Andy Frey, when he was in the Office, 
shepherded the Fourth Amendment cases-is no longer the exclusive 
prerogative of the solicitor general. The model that Thurgood 
Marshall appropriated to the public interest sector is now copied by 
public interest groups of every possible political and jurisprudential 
stripe. 
Finally, the ultimate constraint in this area is that the whole 
premise of picking cases and moving the best one forward in an 
effort to move the law incrementally in a direction that the solicitor 
general, on behalf of the political branches, believes is correct is just 
that-it is a strategy incrementally to move the law. And yet in the 
federalism debate, at least since Garcia/44 the solicitor general and 
the United States have been playing defense; it is the advocates on 
the other side, whether it is the states or people who believe in 
enhanced state power under the Eleventh Amendment or the Tenth 
Amendment or the like, who are trying to move the law. And they 
are doing so very effectively. 
242. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12150 
(1990). 
243. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n Number 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
244. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see, e.g., Reply 
Memo in Opposition to Certification of Plaintiff's Action as a Class Action for Dow Chem. 
Co., III re "Agent Orange" Product Liab. Litig. (Sept. 26, 1979), 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979) (MDL No. 381) (arguing that interests of named plaintiffs might be antagonistic to 
interests of class); Transcript of Oral Argument before Judge Pratt (Jan. 30, 1981), 565 F. 
Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (MDL No. 381) (defense attorney expressing concern for 
representation of future claimants); Defendant's Supplemental Memo in Opposition to Class 
Certification (Nov. 17, 1982),565 F. Supp. 1263 (arguing for direct mail notification to each 
of 2.4 million Vietnam veterans); Defendant's Reply Memo in Opposition to Class 
Certification (Jan. 15, 1983),565 F. Supp. 1263. 
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Coming to understand how these dynamics play into the role 
and responsibilities of the solicitor general was for me the most 
profound of many learning experiences I had as SG. 
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